We estimate that a one-standard-deviation increase in a firm's import penetration ratio raises its likelihood of having engaged in an incremental innovation by 4.48% using a random-sampled firm survey in China. The estimate is close to those in Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell (2010) . A number of empirical strategies rule out alternative explanations as sufficient drivers of our result. Competitive pressure from imports is shown to be an underlying mechanism through which imports spur incremental innovation. We discuss how the link between imports and innovation in the South differ from that in the North.
Section 5 examines indirectly whether competition effect (i.e., foreign imports force domestic firms to improve their production) is a channel through which imports affect firms' incremental innovation. If such is the case, the firms that have pre-innovation rents less affected by imports should have a weaker correlation between their innovation and imports. Section 5.1 uses the heterogeneous response estimationà la Rajan and Zingales (1998) to document such a pattern. Firms with a larger fraction of sales to governmental agencies, which implies that their pre-innovation rents are less affected by imports, have their innovation correlated significantly less with imports.
We also show evidence consistent with the discouragement effect (i.e., domestic firms give up competing with imports because foreign rivals are significantly more superior) in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) . Firms in mature manufacturing industries with products relatively closer to global technological frontiers respond to imports to innovate, but not firms in high-tech manufacturing industries with products relatively far away from global technological frontiers.
Our paper echoes Gorodnichenko et al. (2010) . They document that firms in European developing countries also respond to imports by engaging in more small-step inno- Teshima (2009) measures import competition faced by Mexican firms based on firmspecific import tariff reduction. He shows that tariff reduction raises spending on both process R&D and product R&D. While his main focus is R&D spending, ours is on innovation output rather than input. His import competition measure is also different from ours. To the extent that more R&D spending produces more innovation, our result is closely in-line with his. Aghion et al. (2005) show competition can either promote or discourage innovation. If increased competition reduces pre-innovation rents more than post-innovation rents, firms "escape competition" by innovating (the competitive effect). On the other hand, if preinnovation rents are low to begin with, increased competition primarily reduces postinnovation rents. Firms are thus discouraged from innovating (the discouraging effect).
Linking imports with incremental innovation in the South
The competitive effect likely dominates if a firm has technology on par with that of its competitors. In contrast, the discouraging effect likely dominates if a firm is laggard with low pre-innovation rents to begin with. (2010) note that patenting cannot be a desirable measure of innovation in the South. First, the propensity to patent an innovation varies across countries and regions. Second, methods other than patenting in protecting intellectual properties are likely more effective because the South has weaker formal institutions. Moreover, incremental innovation involves small-step innovation, which are less likely to justify the legal fee of patenting.
Incremental innovation of the South can also be relevant to the exogenous parameter h (the rate at which "laggard firms" move one-step forward along the technology line by copying others' technology) in Aghion et al. (2005) . Increased imports from more advanced countries can strengthen this copying effect (increased imports may raise h) because reverse-engineering or imitating an innovation of a rival is easier than developing an innovation de novo. Schott (2008) shows that China's exports to the US overlap to a surprising extent with those from the OECD countries. Rodrik (2009) shows that China's exports are sophisticated as those of a country three times richer. These evidence is consistent with a significant copying effect in the South.
Foreign imports may also change the taste and preferences of domestic consumers. Domestic firms may engage in innovation to respond to such changes. 2 For example, if a season is the old norm for fashion updates, Zara may have changed the norm in numerous countries into weeks. 3 To the extent that foreign imports fundamentally change the tastes 2 We thank Steven J. Davis for suggesting this mechanism. 3 "Fashion for the masses -Global stretch: When will Zara hit its limits?" The Economist, March 10, 2011.
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and preferences of domestic consumers, firms in the South are likely to innovate more as a response to such changing preferences.
How increased imports affect incremental innovation in the South is ultimately an empirical question. The competitive, copying, and preference-changing effects suggest a positive relationship, whereas the discouraging effect implies a negative relationship. The nature of incremental innovation and the trade pattern of the South reflect, interestingly, some relevance of each of these effects in ways different from those in firms and industries in the North.
Data and Variables
We use data from the Survey of Chinese Enterprises 
Incremental innovation
The SCE captures the concept of incremental innovation by asking whether the firm has introduced any new products/services, business lines, management practice, quality controls, and production processes over the past three years. The dummy Innovation takes the value of 1 if the firm answers yes to any of these questions, and 0 otherwise. Table 1 shows that slightly less than 70% of the firms have engaged in either one of the five types of incremental innovations. 
Imports
We measure imports at the firm level. The variable Import penetration is the natural-log of (one plus the percentage of imports in the firm's major market). On the other hand, a large number of firms engage in more than one industry. Grouping firms into industries can be arbitrary, more so under more disaggregated industry classification. Using firm-level import penetration ratio avoids such a trade-off. We also do not have to assume that all firms within an industry are exposed to the same degree of foreign competition. Suppose firm A focuses on the inland regions, whereas firm B in the same industry focuses on the coastal regions. Assume that both firms face the same level of imports is problematic.
A cost of using our firm-level import penetration, however, is its inherent endogeneity. Firms may shift their major market in response to imports. In addition, the extent of a major market can also vary across firms. Some firms' major markets are national, whereas others' are regional instead. Firms with a few major markets may also report Import penetration by arbitrarily aggregating imports across their major markets. Finally, firms may mis-measure/mis-report imports.
Such potentially arbitrary aggregation and the mis-reporting make our measure more noisy than an otherwise ideal measure of imports that has an objectively defined market with researcher-audited import figures. In multiple regressions, these measurement errors may generate an attenuation bias only if the errors are truly random. However, the measurement errors may not be random and may reflect unobserved firm heterogeneity in innovation capability. If such is the case, these measurement errors can also create an upward bias in the estimate of Import penetration on innovation. 4 This issue is an important concern not to be dismissed.
We therefore also construct an alternative measure: Importers equals the natural-log of (one plus the percentage of overseas competitors), where the percentage is the answer to the question: "considering all your competitors, what percentage (in terms of output) have located their plants overseas?" Table 1 indicates that firms, on average, have 5.69%
of their competitors being importers, which is in the neighborhood of the 6.43% import penetration. Although the two measures are consistent, we cannot entirely rule out measurement errors. Thus, we also rely on instrumental variable estimation for robustness checks. 4 We are grateful for Steven J. Davis and a referee for pointing out this important concern.
9 Shifting major markets in response to imports is another possible source of endogeneity, particularly if we look at breakthrough innovations that are usually outcomes of longterm and major R&D investments. In contrast, incremental innovations are small-step innovations that are more optimization-based. We would expect that incremental innovations are more easily varied choices relative to shifting a firm's major markets, which requires long-term planning and marketing effort. Nonetheless, in our empirical analysis, we take this possible endogeneity seriously by controlling for a host of variables, and by using an IV and the technique of imperfect IV. Moreover, Section 4.2 uses the industry-city average of Import penetration as an alternative measure.
Other controls
To disentangle the effect of import competition on innovation from other globalization To rule out the alternative explanation that technologically-capable firms both innovate more and locate in markets with intense import competition, we directly control for a host of firm and CEO characteristics that proxy individual firms' technological capability. The CEO characteristics are measures of his/her human capital, including CEO education (years of schooling), CEO tenure (years as a CEO), and Deputy CEO previously (a dummy indicating whether the CEO was the deputy CEO before), as well as his/her political capital, which includesGovernment cadre previously (a dummy indicating whether the CEO was a government official before) and Party member (a dummy indicating whether the CEO was a member of the Chinese Communist Party). 
Empirical Analysis
We estimate the following equation:
where X is the set of controls. To deal with heteroskedasticity, the standard errors are White-corrected and are clustered at the industry-city level.
Panel A of Table 2 0.259 = 4.48%. Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in Import penetration corresponds to a 4.48% increase in the average probability of Innovation. This estimate is in the neighborhood of their estimates of 7% and 4%, respectively, for the increase in the probability of developing new product and new technology.
Instrumental variable estimation
Aside from omitted variable bias, endogeneity may result from potential reverse causality: markets more flooded with foreign imports might be a luxury that only more innovative firms can afford. In addition, as discussed, measurement errors may generate biases.
Motivated by Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), we instrument Import penetration with the average of Import penetration among firms belonging to the same industry but located in other cities (denoted Imp i,−c ).
Suppose the firm-level measure of Import penetration (denoted imp) is related to the industry-city level, i.e.,
where f , i, and c index firm, industry and city, respectively. Then imp ic becomes a natural IV for imp f ic : this industry-city average is unlikely to correlate with any omitted firmlevel variables because of random sampling of firms. However, a variety of industrycity level shocks may affect industry-city-level innovation (Innovation ic ) and firm-level innovation (Innovation f ic ). If these shocks are reflected by the industry-city-level import penetration (imp ic ), the IV can be problematic.
We exploit the structure of the data by rewriting imp ic as
where imp i is the industry-average import penetration; c i is the number of cities. Hence,
where c i · imp i is absorbed by the industry dummyλ i ; and imp i,−c =
c =c imp ic is our IV. Controlling for the industry and city dummies, our IV is negatively correlated 13 with imp f ic .
The intuition is that the amount of total imports reflects the industrial policies and the relevant transaction costs of international trade. For example, the more protective the government is of one industry, the lower is this industry's total imports. Melitz's (2003) model, for instance, predicts that falling trade cost results in shrinking domestic market share because some unproductive firms exit and all surviving plants sell less to the domestic market. Given that the industry dummies control for the industrial policies, the inter-city difference within an industry reflects the differential impacts of industrial policies across different cities. Conditioning on the total amount of imports, if the effect of a set of policies is larger in one city, it is also smaller in another city.
The identifying assumption is that conditional on our controls, the IV does not affect innovation through channels other than a firm's own import penetration ratio, i.e.,
This assumption is plausible because the above-mentioned industry-city-level shocks that affect innovation are less likely to be picked up by the import penetration ratios faced by firms in other cities. While measurement errors can be potentially serious at the firmlevel, the average of firms' import penetration likely averages out these errors. The IV is therefore unlikely to systematically correlate with any firm-level measurement errors.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the IV is negatively correlated with the endogenous variable. The F-statistic is significantly above the critical value (10) of the "safe zone" for strong instrument (Staiger and Stock, 1997), which helps rule out the concern of weak instruments. Panel A shows that Import penetration, after being instrumented, still associates positively and significantly with Innovation. Panel C shows the corresponding marginal effect from IV Probit estimation.
The IV estimates are larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. The increase in size 14 is consistent with our concern that there can be potentially serious measurement errors on Import penetration that bias down the OLS estimates. However, our IV may also correlate positively with the error term. This failure of the orthogonal condition (5) will bias up the IV estimates. We address this concern in the following section.
Imperfect IV
Nevo and Rosen (2011) innovate a technique wherein an imperfect IV is used to draw inference; the technique admits relaxing the orthogonal condition of the instrument (5) If more innovative firms tend to stay in markets with more imports, to the extent that our controls do not entirely rule out such possibilities, we would expect a positive correlation between Import penetration and the error term. The upward estimates of the IV estimation also may be an artifact of a positive correlation between the IV and the error term. Hence, Assumption 3, that our IV and the endogenous variable correlate with the error term in the same direction is plausible. In addition, given that our estimation is at the firm-level, arguing that our IV (industry-city level) is even more endogenous than our endogenous variable (firm-level) is implausible. Hence, Assumption 4 is likely to be true.
We then apply Proposition 3 in Nevo and Rosen (2011) to bound the estimate from both sides. 8 Define λ as the ratio between the correlation between the IV and the error term (de-7 Assumptions 1 and 2 are linear specification and exogenous variables for other controls. 8 Precisely, the required condition for bounds in both sides are (σ zx σ x − σ xx σ z )σ zx > 0, where z is the IV, x is the endogenous variable,x is the residual of the exogenous variable after regressing for all the other controls, σ zx is the covariance between z andx, σ x and σ z are the standard deviations of x and z, respectively. Since both σ x , σ z , and σ xx are positive, we only need to check out whether σ zx is negative, i.e., whether the IV, conditioning on other regressors, is negatively correlated with the endogenous variable, which is confirmed in Panel B of Table 3. 15 noted ρ zε ) and the the correlation between the endogenous variable and the error term (denoted ρ xε ), i.e., λ ≡ ρzε ρxε
. Fix a λ, we can construct a "perfect" IV, denoted v(λ), that is correlated with the endogenous variable but not the error term using the following formula:
where x and z are the endogenous variable and the IV, respectively, and σ x and σ z are their respective standard deviations. 9 The problem, however, is that we do not know the value of λ. Assumption 4, that the endogenous variable is at least as endogenous as the IV, implies that λ ∈ [0, 1]. In Proposition 3, Nevo and Rosen (2011) show that performing the same IV estimation using the original IV and the constructed IV with λ = 1 (the worst case in which the IV is as endogenous as the endogenous variable), the two resulting estimated coefficients bound the value of β. Table 4 shows that using the original IV, Import penetration i,−c , the estimate is 0.567, whereas using the constructed IV taking λ = 1, the estimate is 0.208 and is statistically significant. In other words, β is bounded between 0.208, and 0.567. This suggests that even if we entertain the doubt that the IV fails the orthogonal condition, our result that imports spur incremental innovation remains robust.
Robustness
Technologically capable firms locating together? An alternative explanation for our result is that technologically capable firms within an industry self-select to locate at major markets with higher import penetration. Being technologically capable, they also innovate more. Table 6 directly controls for these three industry-city level measures. Given that Import penetration remains statistically significantly positive, our result is unlikely driven by this concern.
Alternative measures. Table 7 shows our results are robust to alternative measures.
Column 1 uses the dummy R&D that takes a value of 1 if the R&D expenditure in 2002 is positive, and 0 otherwise. 11 Column 2 uses the percentage of overseas suppliers in terms of total competitors' output (denoted by Importers). Column 3 uses the industry-city level average of Import penetration i,c , which is better at averaging out any errors if firms misreports their own import penetration ratio.
Different types of innovation.
We also investigate the association between the import penetration ratio and each of the five types of innovation. If a firm has introduced any new products/services, production processes, business lines, management practices, and quality controls over the past three years, the dummies Product, Process, Business, Management and Quality, respectively, take the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. However, an implicit challenge exists. While a firm can engage in different types of incremental innovation, regressing one of the above dummies with Import penetration may involve comparing firms having engaged in that type of innovation with non-innovators, as well as firms having engaged in that type of innovation with those having engaged in other types.
We use two approaches to address this issue. First, we run seemingly unrelated regressions to jointly estimate each of the five types of innovation. Second, we separately estimate each of the five types but drop those firms that have engaged in other types of 10 Controlling these three firm-specific variables directly in the estimation of (1) neither diminishes the significance nor dramatically changes the size of the estimated coefficient of Import penetration. 11 The correlation between R&D and Innovation is 0.309 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. We have also checked that Innovation is statistically significantly correlated with the actual R&D expenditure for the firms in the past years. These expenditure levels are available for manufacturing firms only.
innovation. Doing so ensures that innovators of one particular type of innovation are compared with non-innovators, and the cost is reduced sample size. Panels A and B of Table 8 show the first and second approach, respectively. Consistent with the above concern, the estimates are larger under the second approach. While the second approach shows a positive association between the import penetration ratio and four of the five types of innovations, the statistical significance is weaker under the first approach.
Sample bias and attrition. Although some firms have multiple lines of businesses, Import penetration only pertains to a firm's major business line in its major market. However, Innovation does not distinguish innovations of the major business line from those of other business lines. Are our results driven by the inclusion of firms with multiple lines of businesses? Column 1 of Table 9 contains a sub-sample of firms whose main business contributes over 90% to their total sales. The results suggest that this concern is unlikely to drive our results.
Can attrition bias drive our results? After all, one third of the firms did not report their import penetration ratios. Column 2 follows Duflo (2001) in including the polynomial terms of the propensity in the estimation, where the propensity is the estimated propensity of a firm in answering the survey question on its import penetration ratio based on firm and CEO characteristics. Column 3 uses the inverse-probability-weighted method (Wooldridge, 2002 (Wooldridge, , 2007 , in which the inverse of the estimated propensity is used as the sample weight in the OLS estimation. The results suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by sample attrition bias.
The underlying mechanisms

Competition effects
Firms may strive to improve their production because increased foreign competition forces them to do so. This competitive effect has been documented for firms in the North (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2011). Do firms in the South react to foreign imports by innovating because of increased foreign competitive pressure? In Aghion et al. (2005) , this underlying mechanism implies that increased import competition reduces pre-innovation rents more than post-innovation rents. The competitive effect is weaker if foreign competition cannot easily affect pre-innovation rents.
We exploit this idea by looking at firms' share of output sold to government agencies (denoted by State sales). In China, trade relationships with governmental agencies are largely determined by political connection rather than economic considerations. These sticky relationships suggest that the pre-innovation rents of firms with more sales to government agencies should be less affected by increased import competition. Accrodingly, we use the estimation strategy in Rajan and Zingales (1998). Table 10 shows that the interaction term between Import penetration and State sales has a negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient, implying that firms with more sales to government agencies are less likely to innovate as a response to imports.
A concern is whether the types of firms engaged in governmental sales are inherently different from those in market sales. We thus verify whether firm-level technological capability is strongly correlated with the measure of governmental sales. Table 11 shows no strong evidence. 12 Table 12 follows Henderson, Kuncoro and Turner (1995) in dividing manufacturing industries into two groups: mature industries (including garment and leather products, electronic parts making, household electronics, food processing, and metallurgical products), and new high-tech industries (including electronic equipment, auto and auto parts, chemical products and medicine, and biotech products and Chinese medicine). 13 The discouraging effect of Aghion et al. (2005) dominates if the laggard firms are further away from the technological frontier. We find a consistent pattern that Import penetration is positive and significant only firms in mature manufacturing industries where the technology gap with developed countries is narrow. However, in high-tech industries where technological gap is huge, we find insignificant and even negative estimated coefficient.
High-tech versus mature manufacturing industries
Conclusion
The South has increasingly engaged in innovations, which have significant implications on both the global science landscape and the international trade pattern. This paper documents that imports are robust determinants of their incremental innovations. This finding echoes with that on firms in the North. Specifically, the firm survey by the World Bank in China shows that firms facing higher import penetration are more likely to engage in incremental innovations.
Our paper focuses on ruling out other alternative explanations. Using different strategies, along with a battery of robustness checks, our paper documents that the result is unlikely to be attributed to other global connections, endogeneity, or the clustering of technologically capable firms in markets with intense import competition. We also find that firms in the South do respond to imports by innovating because foreign competition forces them to improve their production, an underlying mechanism for understanding the responses of firms in the North.
A Data appendix: the Survey of Chinese Enterprises (SCE)
The Note: White-robust standard errors clustered at the industry-city level are reported in brackets. * * and * * * represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. A constant term is included in each regression. The first stages of the IV estimations include the same set of control variables as in the corresponding second stage, but the estimated coefficients of these control variables are not reported to save space. Panel C reports the marginal effect of IV-Probit estimation. White-robust standard errors clustered at the industry-city level are reported in brackets. * * represents statistical significance at the 5% level. A constant is included in each regression. The first stages of the IV estimations include the same set of control variables as in the corresponding second stage. White-robust standard errors clustered at the industrycity level are reported in brackets. * and * * represent statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. A constant is included in each regression. Note: White-robust standard errors clustered at the industry-city level are reported in brackets. * and * * represent statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. A constant is included in each regression. Column 1 includes only firms with their major line of businesses accounting for more than 90% of their total sales. Column 2 includes the polynomial terms, while Column 3 uses the inverse of the estimated propensity of reporting import penetration ratio as sample weight. Note: White-robust standard errors clustered at the industry-city level are reported in brackets. * * and * * * represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. A constant is included in the regression. 
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